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COMMENTS
Moore: Building
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BUILDING PERMITS: RESCISSION AND EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL
Sakolsky v. City of Coral Cables,
151 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1963)
Plaintiff was granted a permit by the defendant city for the construction of a twelve-story luxury apartment building. Upon the filling
of a subsequent vacancy on the city commission the permit was revoked. Plaintiff had incurred substantial expense in reliance on the
permit but had not begun actual construction. The plaintiff brought
an action in the circuit court to enjoin recission of the building permit.
The circuit court dismissed the complaint, and the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed. 1 On certiorari, HELD, a municipality is precluded under the doctrine of equitable estoppel from revoking a building permit when permittee has acted in good faith and has substantially altered his position, even though permittee knew that the official
mind might be changed by an impending municipal election. Reversed and remanded.
The general rule is that a validly issued building permit upon which
the holder has substantially relied cannot be revoked except for fraud,
misrepresentation, or concealment.2 The extent of the permittee's reliance has been the determinative factor in most of the cases that have
adopted this position.8 The Florida courts, however, have developed
an additional approach that turns on the concept of notice.4 Revocations of valid building permits have been upheld in several cases,5 even
after the permittees had incurred substantial expense in reliance on
their permits.0 According to this theory, the holder of a permit is not
1. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 139 So. 2d 504, 505 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1962).
2. 9 McQtiL.A, MuNIcnAL COROPRATIONS §26.214 (3d ed. 1950); 1 YoKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §100 (2d ed. 1953).
3. City & County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 185 Colo. 289, 810 P.2d 296
(1957); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Des Plaines, 21 Del. 2d 157, 171 N.E.2d 605
(1961); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 82 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960); Willis v.
Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1942); State v. Board of Appeals, 267 Wis. 809, 64 N.W.2d 741 (1954).
4. See Note, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 418 (1962), for a study of the situation in
Florida.
5. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955); Miami Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post No. 124 of Am. Legion, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So. 2d 38
(1945); City of Miami v. State ex rel. Ergene, Inc., 132 So. 2d 474 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1961); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Inc., 97 So. 2d
47 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
6. But see Kaeslin v. Adams, 97 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1957); Bregar v. Britton, 75
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justified in relying on it if he had knowledge that the official mind
might change."
The court, in the present case, receded from the eighteen-year-old
case of Miami Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post,8 which was a
classic example of the application of the notice concept. In Brockway,
the permittees in reliance on their permit had incurred considerable
expense, even to the extent of pouring the foundation. The court held,
however, that they could not rely on the permit because they were on
notice or "had good reason to believe" 9 that the official mind might
change as a result of a forthcoming election. The Brockway rule has
been controlling in a subsequent line of decisions. 10 Referring to
Brockway, the court in Sakolsky said:"
[W]e believe that the rule there pronounced, that an impending change of municipal officers can prevent reliance on an act
of the current governing body, is in error and inconsistent with
precedent condemning arbitrary action by these public bodies.
The notice rationale might be viewed as part of a broader concept
of good faith. Thus, in order to be protec'ted against revocation, a permittee must have acted in good faith until he has reached the point of
substantial reliance. If he relied on a permit while charged with notice of an impending change in the official mind, he would not be
deemed to have acted in good faith. It should be noted that the court
while rejecting the notice concept as set forth in Brockway did not dispense with the concept of good faith. Indeed, the court found it necessary to conclude expressly that Sakolsky had acted in good faith and
12
was therefore entitled to protection.
The retention of such an elastic concept as "good faith" may be a
limitation on the scope of this decision. The use of the term as a precise standard would be difficult, if not impossible, in many cases. The
court did indicate some situations that apparently do not depict good

So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1954); Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44 So. 2d 808 (Fla.

1950).
7. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 189 So. 2d 504 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
8. 156 Fla. 678,24 So. 2d 88 (1945).
9. City of Miami v. State ex rel. Ergene, Inc., 132 So. 2d 474, 476 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
10. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955); City of Miami v.
State ex rel. Ergene, Inc., 132 So. 2d 474 (8d D.C.A. Fla. 1961); City of Ft.
Lauderdale v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Inc., 97 So. 2d 47 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1957).
11. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1963).
12. Id. at 436.
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faith.' 3 These were situations wherein the permittee, at the time of
reliance, was a party defendent in legal action attacking the permit's
validity or had notice that his permit might have been invalid at its
inception. A permit may also be revoked if such action is required in
the public interest. The court concluded that since these situations
were not present, good faith would be attributed to the permitee.14 If
this can be taken as authority for the proposition that the situations
described are exclusive instances of bad faith, then perhaps the limits
of the good faith concept have been marked with some degree of certainty. What constitutes sufficient public interest, as well as what degree of notice of initial invalidity is necessary to impute bad faith, are
questions, however, that are unanswered and serve to limit the full
effect of this decision.
Although this case is limited to a situation involving an impending
election, hopefully it will mark the start of a trend towards greater stability in the entire area of municipal zoning. Perhaps the Brockway
rule was designed to achieve this result by insuring that the mistakes,
or actual abuses, of some zoning boards could be corrected by subsequently elected officials. A better way to promote responsible decision making would be to impart finality to the decision once it is made.
Changes in the procedures for granting the initial permit would be
the most appropriate remedy for any abuses that might exist. Once a
permittee has received a permit, however, he should be able to rely on
it. Certainly he cannot rely on proposed changes that may or may not
become law.' 5 Sakoisky, by bringing Florida in line with the majority
view, gives the permittee much needed protection and should serve to
strengthen and stabilize municipal zoning.
H. EDwAw Moom, JR.

18. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See Note, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 418 (1962), urging complete elimination of
the notice concept.
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